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Abstract
Peer-to-peer (P2P) lending has the potential to boost financial inclusion in emerging
markets. This paper contributes to the literature on fintech governance in emerging
Asian markets. It examines the case of the Indonesian government’s approach in
regulating the P2P lending sector using both primary interviews and secondary firm-
level data. Driven by regulation tightening in China and regulatory gaps in Indonesia,
Chinese investments became the largest in this sector contributing, however, to
growing risks from illegal business practices. The Indonesian government responded by
creating new regulations and institutions, mitigating risks without stifling the potential
for financial inclusion. We conclude a proactive approach towards monitoring and
regulating emerging high-tech industries should be sought by strengthening links with
industry and civil society, and through international cooperation for policy and
knowledge sharing.
Keywords: Fintech, P2P, Internet finance, Governance, Emerging market
Introduction
Peer-to-peer lending (also known as P2P lending, or platform lending) is a relatively
new form of online lending that matches potential borrowers with investors using
digital and communications technologies. Since the world’s first online P2P lending
platform, Zopa, started in the United Kingdom in 2005, platforms have sprung up
around the world. The global P2P lending market was valued at US$26 billion in 2015
and is projected to reach US$460 billion by 2022, growing at an annual rate of 51.5%
(Research and Markets 2017). This growth is propelled by not just developed econ-
omies, such as the United States and Europe, but to an increasing extent by emerging
markets. While formal borrowing is the most common source of credit in high-income
economies (almost 90% of borrowers employed financial institutions or credit cards in
2017), borrowing from family and friends is most common in developing economies
(World Bank 2017a). Besides, emerging markets face significant financing gaps for
MSMEs (Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises). The gap of the East Asia and Pacific
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region accounts to USD 2.4 billion, representing 54% of the global MSME figure
(World Bank 2017b). The increasing convergence of banking and mobile services in
emerging markets is not only allowing banks to get around the constraints of trad-
itional brick-and-mortar outlets, but also enabling technology leapfrogging to reach
these under-banked groups (Amankwah-Amoah 2019).
Asia and, particularly, Southeast Asia represent some of the most promising markets
for online lending because of four main reasons: the large and young population, the
high Internet penetration and smartphone usage, the growing spending market, and the
largely unbanked population. Indonesia is the perfect example. According to the Indo-
nesian Financial Services Authority (or OJK, Otoritas Jasa Keuangan), by December
2018, the loans disbursed from registered lenders had totaled over 22.66 trillion IDR
(1.58 billion USD1) (OJK 2018a). However, P2P lending also poses a rising challenge
for emerging-market regulators. The case of Indonesia provides a useful example to
examine the effect of foreign investments from other countries such as China on the
domestic regulatory environment. Unless they have already done so, policymakers in
Southeast Asia’s emerging economies and beyond will need to follow with regulations
and institutional responses, as they will find themselves dealing with similar issues to
China and Indonesia. Particularly, the Chinese and Indonesian cases highlight the pit-
falls of a reactive regulation approach. Through proactive regulatory approaches, other
emerging markets can drive the online lending industries towards areas of needs, as in
the case of Malaysia allowing P2P lending only for MSMEs, or promote better invest-
ments, as in the case of Chinese companies eyeing acquisitions in the credit-starved
but already developed Indian market (Jao 2019).
This paper examines Indonesia’s innovative and prompt regulatory and institutional
responses to the expansion of online P2P lending backed by foreign investments pre-
dominantly from China using both primary interviews and secondary firm-level data. It
starts by analyzing the P2P lending expansion in China, the resultant risks, and recent
regulation efforts. It then analyzes the development of the P2P lending sector in
Indonesia, the entry of Chinese capital, and the Indonesian government’s response
resulting in policy and institutional changes in P2P lending governance. The paper ar-
gues that the Indonesian approach to regulation is to mitigate risks from market expan-
sion powered by foreign capital (primarily from China) without stifling innovation’s
potential to boost financial inclusion. To do so, the state has imposed regulatory and
institutional changes to promote synergy with market players and industry self-
regulation. The study concludes with policy recommendations and directions for future
research.
Literature review
The growing convergence of information technology and financial services in the devel-
oping world has led to new research on the fast-moving development of financial tech-
nologies such as online lending. Scholars have focused on the interplay of financial
products and services, technologies, risks, and institutions, and how they shape out-
comes such as financial inclusion and poverty reduction in various national contexts
11 USD = 14,363.07 IDR (May 2019)
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(Shen, 2015; Buckley & Webster, 2016; Stern et al. 2017; Tsai 2017; Claessens et al.
2018; Malady et al. 2018; Bateman et al. 2019; Clarke 2019; Singh 2019; Suryono et al. 2019;
Lai and Samers 2020; Ehrentraud et al. 2020; Thakor 2020; Wang et al. 2020). Recent re-
ports also examined the potential outcomes of a larger share of fintech-facilitated credit in
the economy, finding that while it could increase financial stability by providing access to al-
ternative funding sources and creating efficiency pressures on incumbent banks, it might
also weaken lending standards and introduce more procyclical credit provision in the econ-
omy (FSB 2017). The rapid fintech growth in China and Southeast Asia led to new research
examining domestic regulatory regimes and challenges in these markets and the roles of
government regulations through either a single-country or a comparative lens (Shim and
Shin 2016; Davis et al. 2017; Loubere 2017; Gruin and Knaack 2019; Yang et al. 2018;
Huang 2018; Wang 2018a; Wang 2018b; Xu et al. 2019; Yu and Shen 2019; You 2017; Shay-
dullina 2018). For instance, Iwasaki’s study (2018) examines the emergence of fintech firms
in Southeast Asia. It analyzes activities such as mobile payments, money transfers, and on-
line lending as solutions to solve existing problems in finance, and the regulatory schemes
to manage risks and economic growth. Iman (2018) examines fintech development in
Indonesia through expert interviews and argues that regulatory immaturity potentially ex-
poses users to fraud. Pulse Lab Jakarta’s study (2018) takes a design-thinking approach and
interviews micro enterprises who are either agents or users of fintech, and finds that while
high-level policymaking can boost financial inclusion, design principles that address the
mental barriers and enabling factors for fintech adoption are vital for the micro enterprises
to actively use and benefit from fintech. PwC’s study (2019) on Indonesia’s unique fintech
lending ecosystem finds that the target market for fintech lending includes both under-
served individuals and MSMEs with limited physical and data access. Its principle-based
and collaborative regulatory approach aims to control the market and minimize unethical
practices while enabling the ecosystem to grow.
Existing literature has also analyzed the financial technologies as “disruptive
innovation” (Palmié et al. 2020) and new mechanisms by governments, institutions and
firms to adapt to rapid technological change. For instance, research has examined the
phases of development of the industry, and the legal, financial, and institutional designs
required to spur innovation by balancing competition and collaboration, with the re-
sponsibility to mitigate risks for consumers, investors, and the financial system from
technology development (Pei 2018; Palmié et al. 2020). A major focus in new govern-
ment policy mechanisms is the regulatory sandbox approach, launched in the United
Kingdom in 2016 and subsequently emulated by numerous other countries. The regula-
tory sandbox is “a framework set up by a financial sector regulator to allow small-scale,
live testing of innovations by private firms in a controlled environment (operating
under a special exemption, allowance, or other limited, time-bound exception) under
the regulator’s supervision” (Jenik and Lauer 2017). Davis et al. (2017) explain that
Indonesia’s legal and regulatory measures, especially the regulatory sandbox to regulate
online P2P lending, follow a pragmatic approach that is close to international best prac-
tices to help grow the sector and enable SME financing. They argue that, compared
with advanced economies, Indonesian regulations have stronger education and
national-interest focus and weaker consumer protection.
Other scholars have focused on specific challenges in P2P lending in Indonesia, in-
cluding consumer protection, legality of the apps, interest rates, debt collection, and
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loan default. For instance, Pranata and Farandy (2019) proposed a big-data-based risk
surveillance system for P2P lending based on platforms’ reviews on Google Play. They
found that OJK had not authorized most of the apps, and these illegal apps on average
had worse review ratings than authorized apps. In addition, they found many negative
reviews related to unethical debt collection and excessive interest rates, recommending
special supervision by OJK for risky platforms. Santoso et al. (2019) found that specific
characteristics of loans and borrowers could explain differences in interest rate and
loan default status, and recommended more extensive information disclosure by plat-
forms and stronger platform supervision by OJK with mandatory reporting to decrease
information asymmetry and lower the cost of borrowing.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in two ways. Firstly, existing fintech
literature tends to conceptualize and analyze regulatory changes in a country by tracing
domestic market expansion along with the economic and social impacts that warrant
enhanced regulation, or domestic stakeholder actions, or networks that drive policy
changes (Shim and Shin 2016; Davis et al. 2017; Claessens et al. 2018; Wang 2018a;
Palmié et al. 2020). What has garnered less attention is the broader picture of fintech
as a global industry powered by transnational capital flows and the role of foreign busi-
ness practices and investments in influencing the domestic environment, triggering
governance responses. Often, technologies in emerging markets are imported from de-
veloped economies or large and technologically advanced emerging markets like China.
As this paper shows, the movement of foreign capital into under-regulated markets can
lead to new business practices, and to economic and social impacts that prompt
changes into existing regulatory and institutional frameworks. Our empirical findings
provide important evidence to understand the impact of foreign investments on fintech
industry development and the governance mechanisms to manage the growth pains of
the industry in an emerging market. Secondly, this study contributes empirically and
methodologically to the small body of research on online lending and fintech govern-
ance in Southeast Asia. Our analysis employs data from primary interviews, as well as
secondary firm-level data of OJK-registered online lending platforms, with aggregated
information on investor relations and loan product types from numerous sources. To
our knowledge, this is the first scholarly analysis of this recent phenomenon drawing
on both primary and secondary data.
On a broader theoretical level, our study also contributes to the discussion on the
role of the Asian state in economic governance, specifically in relation to recent schol-
arship on the developmental state (Johnson 1982). This model initially focused on East
Asia’s development miracle in the 1980s, to the “plan-rational state” and its autono-
mous economic bureaucracy favoring resource allocation in its target industries.
Scholars emphasized the importance of the state’s interaction with the market and soci-
ety while maintaining its capacity to achieve development goals (Wade 1990; Weiss
1998). More recent scholarship has moved even further and argued that the develop-
mentally oriented states need to adapt to globalized trade and domestic socio-
economic transition. The government’s role in developing Asia has reoriented towards
policy creation and coordination to sustain growth within the global regimes of produc-
tion, with increased delegation of certain responsibilities to business and professional
self-regulation, and to civil society (Braithwaite 2008; Jarvis 2012; Jayasuriya 2001;
Carroll and Jarvis 2017). In the context of technological and sustainability transitions in
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Southeast Asia, scholars found that “capitalist developmental states in East and South-
east Asia have been better able to harness global economic forces through an openness
to trade and investment and effective public–private institutions” (Rock et al. 2009, p.
14). Our findings concur with such analysis, as Indonesia’s fintech governance approach
seeks to promote domestic industry expansion and mitigate risks associated with the
global flow of capital and technology by actively building industry linkages and profes-
sional self-regulatory institutions.
Methodology
The research employs a case study methodology, which allows the investigator to
understand complex phenomena retaining “the holistic and meaningful characteristics
of real-life events” (Yin 2003). We rely on a mix of secondary data and primary inter-
view data. The twenty-five in-depth interviews with experts were collected through a
snowball sampling method starting from contacts in fintech startup firms, foreign in-
vestment agencies, consulting and banking firms. Table 1 summarizes the details of
such interviews with the corresponding interview code.
The interviews were conducted both in person, during two visits to Jakarta in August
2018 and in July-August 2019, and over the phone in early 2019. Interviews were semi-
structured, generally divided into three parts: background of the P2P lending market in
Indonesia, policies related to P2P lending, an overview of their company or association.
Some interviews were conducted and recorded in Bahasa Indonesia or Chinese, and
later translated into English. We performed a pattern thematic analysis by grouping
interview data under themes such as industry background, practices, governance. This
process allowed us to perform triangulations across different interviews and with the
quantitative data.
Information on fintech and its relevant policies in China and Indonesia was gathered
from official government documents and translated into English when necessary. Given
the limitation of the scholarly and legal literature on the fintech space in Indonesia, we
have also obtained secondary data from industry sources, news reports, and press releases.
For our data analysis on firm-level investments and products, we collected a list of
registered online P2P companies from OJK’s website. As of December 2018, OJK had
released a list of 88 registered entities (OJK 2019), containing information such as the
platform’s name, website URL, the name of the registered company, the registration num-
ber, the registration date, funding information, and lending products. We obtained owner-
ship information mainly from the platform’s website and press releases, and obtained start-
up funding information from Crunchbase.com. We also collected information from other
relevant sources, such as LinkedIn company pages. Information about the firm leadership
and the language requirements in job postings allowed us to deduce the platform’s possible
ties to foreign investment. For instance, a recently established platform with a Chinese
CEO may originate from China. We consider a start-up that has received funding from
Chinese venture capital to have ties to Chinese investment, and similarly so for other coun-
tries. Information on the types of loan products was collected from the respective plat-
form’s websites and subsequently categorized into short-term loans and non-short-term
loans. We also divided the product types by the primary target markets, namely MSME or
corporations, consumer or individuals, Sharia loans, education funds, health funds,
agriculture funds, maritime funds, real estate funds, e-commerce financing, and women-
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specific financing. Some newly registered companies did not have any information on their
investor relations and product types, so we classified them as not having enough
information.
China’s rise in online lending
China has become a major fintech market power. In online lending, China is the
world’s largest market in terms of accumulated loan disbursed (Morgan Stanley Re-
search 2015). The first Chinese online lending platform, PPDAI Group, was launched
in 2007 (Liu 2018a, 2018b). By July 2017, there were 5029 P2P platforms with over 1.09
trillion RMB (163 billion USD) in outstanding loans (Tsai 2017). China also has the
world’s highest adoption rate of fintech services. According to a survey, 69% of the
Table 1 Table of Interviewee Characteristics
No. Organization Role Time Mode Location
1 P2P platform CEO 1/2019 Over the phone
2 Asosiasi Fintech Pendanaan
Bersama Indonesia
(or AFPI, the Indonesian Fintech
Lending Association)
P2P platform
Vice-Chairman,
CEO and founder
2/2019 Over the phone
3 Bank Head of Investment team 9/2019 Over the phone
4 International consulting firm Head of China desk 7/2018 In person Jakarta
5 Chamber of Commerce Chief Representative 8/2018 In person Jakarta
6 Indonesian Institute of Sciences Researcher 5/2019 Over the phone
7 AFPI
P2P platform
Vice Chairman
CEO and founder
7/2019 In person Jakarta
8 Welab Head 7/2019 In person Jakarta
9 Law firm Associate 7/2019 in person Jakarta
10 Government research institute Researcher 7/2019 In person Jakarta
11 Chamber of Commerce Chief Representative 7/2019 In person Jakarta
12 P2P platform Co-founders 7/2019 In person Jakarta
13 P2P platform CEO 7/2019 In person Jakarta
14 Insurance company Director 7/2019 In person Jakarta
15 International consulting firm Senior Associate 7/2019 In person Jakarta
16 Research institute Senior economist 7/2019 In person Jakarta
17 Research institute Partnership Officer, Policy Engagement
Officer
7/2019 In person Jakarta
18 Logistic company Research Head 7/2019 In person Jakarta
19 P2P platform / P2P
association
CEO / Head of consumer lending 7/2019 In person Jakarta
20 Law firm Deputy Managing Partner 7/2019 In person Jakarta
21 Logistic company Head of Business
Development
7/2019 In person Jakarta
22 Insurance company Vice Head 7/2019 In person Jakarta
23 Consumer protection
association
Head 7/2019 In person Jakarta
24 Government Investment
Coordination Board
Head of China desk 7/2019 In person Jakarta
25 Venture Capital firm Founder 8/2019 In person Singapore
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Chinese population has used fintech services, and 46% has used online borrowing (EY
2017). Fintech companies such as Alibaba’s Ant Financial, the world’s highest-valued
“unicorn” (private companies with valuations above USD 1 billion) are leading innova-
tors. According to a Cambridge University survey, approximately 15% of the budget of
major Chinese P2P platforms went towards research and development (R&D) initiatives
in areas such as automation (Cambridge Center for Alternative Finance 2018).
Several factors have facilitated the rise of online lending in China (Huang 2018).
Firstly, China has a vast Internet user base, with 904 million Internet users as of March
2020, accounting for 64.6% of the total population (CNNIC 2020), and its Internet
penetration rate is still growing. Secondly, the traditional banking system favors state-
owned enterprises, and does not offer easy access to finance for MSMEs and private
households. In 2017, China faced an MSMEs financing gap of 1.89 trillion USD, and
only 22.7% of Chinese aged over 15 accessed credit through formal borrowing (World
Bank 2017a; World Bank 2017b). Thirdly, online lending offers much higher interest
rates than traditional bank deposits, whose rates are under the control of the People’s
Bank of China (PBOC), providing investors with an attractive alternative. As an ex-
ample, the average interest rate for a five-year certificate of deposit (CD), the deposit
product with the highest rate at most banks, was 3.445% in 2018 (Zhuo 2019). In com-
parison, according to data on the website of Wangdaizhijia (https://shuju.wdzj.com/), a
P2P research portal, investments in online lending platforms in 2018 had an anticipated
yearly average return between 9.58% and 10.3%. In the words of an industry expert, “in-
vestors keep going back to P2P because there are no other alternative investments
ready for them” (Feng 2018).
However, the online lending boom with little regulatory oversight generated signifi-
cant financial risks. Before 2015, P2P lending platforms in China operated in a regula-
tory vacuum: they only had to register with the local administration of industry and
commerce, with no minimum market entry requirements, no industry standards, and
no regulators overseeing the sector (Zhang and Pan 2016). By the end of 2015, 1031
online P2P platforms were marked as “in trouble,” out of 3448 platforms in operation.
These “in-trouble” platforms had cash shortage in paying off investors, run-away
owners leaving without settling outstanding debts, or were under investigation for eco-
nomic crimes (Liu 2018a). One example is Ezubao, one of the largest P2P lending plat-
forms, which collapsed in 2015. Its employees were charged for effectively creating a
Ponzi scheme using fake lending projects, failing to repay as much as 38 billion RMB
to investors (Feng 2018). The situation turned political, as investors losing their savings
traveled to protest in front of regulatory agencies in Beijing and other provincial capi-
tals, prompting local governments to censor what they viewed as social instability (Li et
al 2018).
Social discontent involving loan sharking, identity theft, consumer privacy violations,
and misleading marketing were also abundant. For instance, some Chinese P2P plat-
forms monitored the borrowers’ smartphone use without permission, and collected
data such as phone contact lists, call logs, and location services to track defaulting bor-
rowers and harass their family and friends. Security breaches that enabled the stealing
of user information were also on the rise (Stevenson and Li 2017). The Chinese govern-
ment has banned the approval of credit cards for students under the age of eighteen
since 2009 and required adult college students to have written permission from
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guardians to apply for credit cards. Sensing this potential underserved market, online
platforms also employed unethical measures to aggressively target young borrowers for
whom obtaining commercial loans was difficult. Online lenders on Jiedaibao, a P2P
platform, targeted female college student borrowers and demanded “naked loans” -
nude photos and videos as collateral to be eligible for higher loan amounts. Lenders
threatened to publish the photos online if the payments were not on time (Leavenworth
2016). The naked photos and videos of over 100 women were leaked online later (AFP
2016). State media also reported suicides of students linked to excessive online borrow-
ing (Zhang and Pan 2016). As a result, in 2016 the Ministry of Education issued a state-
ment with the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) demanding closer
scrutiny of lending advertising and credit evaluation targeting students (PRC Ministry
of Education and China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission 2016).
Facing growing market and social pressures, the Chinese government started regulat-
ing online lending (Xu et al. 2019). The Guiding Opinions on Promoting the Sound
Development of Internet Finance, released in 2015, defined the P2P platforms’ roles
strictly as information intermediaries, with no ability to provide credit enhancement,
concentrate funds, or raise funds illegally (PBOC et al. 2015). The Supreme Court of
China stipulated legal rules about private online lending in 2015, such as loan interest
(payments with rate below 24% are protected by law, between 24% and 36% are volun-
tary responsibilities of borrowers, exceeding 36% are illegal) (Supreme People’s Court
of China 2015). Central regulators jointly released an interim directive on P2P lending
in 2016 (CBRC et al. 2016), including clauses on registration, loan requirements, mar-
keting, information privacy and security, consumer protection, and anti-money-
laundering measures. Subsequently, a series of policies formed a more comprehensive
regulatory framework imposing stricter rules on platform registration (CBRC 2016b),
fund management and deposit with an approved custodian bank (CBRC 2017a), and in-
formation disclosure and management (CBRC 2017b). In 2016, CBRC, the main finan-
cial regulator, also waged a special national campaign jointly with other central
agencies, local governments, and police forces to curb online lending risks and elimin-
ate illegal practices (CBRC 2016a). Platforms needed to obtain three documents by the
end of 2018 to avoid being shut down by regulators: the ICP (Internet Content Pro-
vider) license, the National Information System Security Protection Level 3 Certificate,
and the Custodian Bank’s approval on a government-approved whitelist (Liu 2018b).
Regulators also worked with industry players to create new self-regulating industry
associations to guide compliance. In 2016, PBOC, in collaboration with CBRC, CSRC
(China Securities Regulatory Commission), and CIRC (China Insurance Regulatory
Commission) created the National Internet Finance Association of China (NIFA) to
support governance efforts. NIFA had more than 400 initial corporate members, in-
cluding 19 online lending platforms. Similar local-level internet finance associations
have also sprung up in major cities across the country to promote industry develop-
ment and regulatory compliance. For instance, since February 2019, the Beijing Internet
Finance Association has been working with online lenders registered in Beijing to pro-
tect investors from runaway debt, through the public release of a list of companies and
individuals with unpaid debts due on online platforms (People’s Daily 2019).
As a result, the industry has been going through a significant correction. As Fig. 1
shows, net new investments into Chinese online lending platforms have fluctuated with
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increased regulatory stringency and have turned negative since mid-2018. In June
2018, the head of CBRC issued a public warning that investors betting on risky
platforms should be “prepared to lose the entire amount of their principal for any
investment with an estimated return of more than 10 percent” (Jiang 2018). CBRC
started the review process for platforms in August 2018. By November 2018, the
number of online lending platforms had dropped from the peak of 3448 platforms
in 2015 to merely 1181. Only 110 platforms, less than 10% of those in operation,
secured the three licenses by 2018 (Liu 2018a, 2018b). The special campaign was
extended to June 2019 to allow more time for existing platforms to correct non-
compliant behavior and obtain licenses (Xu et al. 2019). Further, in November
2019, a notice issued by China’s Internet Financial Risk Special Rectification Work
Leadership Team Office demanded that all existing P2P firms clear outstanding
debt in two years and transition to become online small loan providers (Reuters
2019). Online small loan providers would have to rely on funding from institutions
and cannot grow their business using investment from small investors, and need to
have the minimum registered capital of 50 million RMB to receive provincial-level
license or 1 billion RMB to receive nationwide license (Lee 2020). The policy has
effectively mandated the exit of non-institutional investors as well as smaller and
less-established firms from the industry.
Facing a stricter environment at home, Chinese investors and platform developers
have expanded to untapped emerging markets. The geographical proximity between
China and Southeast Asia, existing business relationships among local Chinese commu-
nities, along with the large unbanked population make Southeast Asia a desirable des-
tination for overseas expansion. The lightly regulated Indonesian market, when
compared to the tightening regulatory oversight in China, coupled with an open ap-
proach by the government to develop the industry, attracted online Chinese lenders to
unlock new opportunities following the next gold rush (Interview8; Interview11;
Interview13).
The gold rush into Indonesia
P2P lending has enormous potential in Indonesia. With a population exceeding 260
million, Indonesia is the world’s fourth most populous country and Southeast Asia’s
Fig. 1 Net new investments into Chinese online P2P platforms by month (unit: USD billion) Data source:
P2P industry data from Wangdaizhijia, a Chinese P2P research firm (https://shuju.wdzj.com/industry-list.html)
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largest digital market. In 2017, the country had 143.3 million active internet users,
124.8 million mobile phone users, and a booming e-commerce sector with 20% Year-
on-Year (Y-o-Y) growth (Internetworldstats 2018; Hootsuite 2018). However, as of
2017, only 49% of the population had a bank account, and merely 2% owned credit
cards (World Bank 2017a). Systemic issues in financial services administration, low fi-
nancial literacy, and poor access to market have rendered it difficult for brick-and-
mortar banks to reach the underbanked (Iwasaki 2018). This financing gap also pertains
to MSMEs (Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises), which despite contributing to 60%
of the nation’s GDP experienced a 166 billion USD financing gap in 2017 (World Bank
2017b). As a result, P2P lending platforms in Indonesia have boomed in the past few
years attracting both domestic and foreign investors.
Foreign investors in Indonesia’s online lending sector come from diverse origins
(e.g., China, Europe, Singapore, USA). Amongst the first to enter Indonesia were East-
ern European companies (Interview1), but since 2016 Chinese companies have be-
come the dominant and most active group. The Vice President of Asosiasi Fintech
Pendanaan Bersama Indonesia (or AFPI, the Indonesian Fintech Lending Association)
outlined three main reasons for this. Firstly, the recent policy in China that regulated
the industry made some people who “had lost their piece of the pie” look for (market)
substitutes. Indonesia was one of the possible and attractive alternatives. Secondly,
Chinese players have the technological capability to build lending platforms. Finally,
some of these platforms also have substantial financial resources (Interview2). Several
interviewees confirmed these reasons (Interview6; Interview8; Interview11; Inter-
view23; Interview25). Most of the Chinese players entered the market providing
short-term consumer loans (Interview1). Such loans usually carry a much higher
interest rate with a shorter loan period (i.e., less than 30 days), with a quick loan turn-
around (usually in a few minutes to a few hours) (Kagan 2018).
The role of Chinese capital
Investor origin
As of December 2018, OJK had released a list of 88 registered online lending firms
in Indonesia. From our findings and analysis of the directory, we found details of
funding or ownership information in 47 companies (see Table 2). The other 41
firms were new corporations without available information or companies with little
or no disclosed information online. Out of the 47 companies, we found that at
least 18 firms (38%) had Chinese shareholders (see Fig. 2). The second and third
most common foreign funding sources were other Southeast Asian countries (15
firms) and Japan (9 firms). Additionally, we found investments from the United
States (9 firms), Europe (including United Kingdom, 3 firms), and other countries
(4 firms). These are not mutually exclusive, as many firms received funding from
multiple foreign investors. Our findings are in line with our interview data, which
have shown that most foreign players at the time came from mainland China.
Chinese investors “often set up shell companies in Hong Kong and Singapore to
bypass Beijing’s strict controls over cross-border money flows and hire proxy
agents as local partners” (Interview19; Interview25; Potkin et al. 2018). Hence, the
actual proportion of firms with Chinese investments could have been higher.
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Mode of entry
Foreign companies that enter the Indonesian market have to collaborate with an Indo-
nesian entity. According to Anderson and Gatignon (1986)'s clustering of entry modes
based on the entrant’s level of control, we suggest that these comprise: dominant equity
interests (majority shareholder capped at 85% per OJK regulation), balanced interests
(plurality shareholders or equal partnerships), and diffused interests.
In one example of foreign capital entry as dominant majority shareholder, a Chinese
P2P platform expanding to Indonesia had set up a holding company in the Cayman
Islands. The company’s headquarters for R&D and product support are in China, yet its
main business is set up in Indonesia through a partnership with a local company, to
keep the foreign ownership at the maximum of 85% (Interview1). As one interviewee
suggests, “If they (Chinese firms) want to go alone, some of them choose to go alone
and just deploy to the market directly. In that case, they just find local people or a local
partner and give them 15%” (Interview8). However, as a senior VC executive noted, this
approach despite common, often leads to failure due to a lack of competency in this
sector (Interview25).
One of the most common ways to enter the market of P2P lending in Indonesia is
through joint ventures (JV) (Interview8; Interview11; Interview19; Interview23). While
in certain cases, interviewees have argued that JVs are mostly self-serving for
Table 2 Summary of possible investors out of 47 registered P2P lending firms
Possible Investors No. of Firms Distribution
Indonesia 9 19.1%
China (including Hong Kong) 18 38.3%
Japan 9 19.1%
Southeast Asia (excludes Indonesia) 15 31.9%
Europe 3 6.4%
USA 9 19.1%
Other 4 8.5%
Note: Total percentage is more than 100% as one firm may have multiple investors
Platform investors
Fig. 2 Information on country of origin of platform investors of 47 registered P2P lending firms
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Chinese companies (Interview8; Interview25), there are positive examples in which
there is a clear strategy to work together. Often, Chinese companies provide capital
and technology, and the Indonesian partner actively provides access to and know-
ledge of the market, bridging their cultural gap (Interview19). For instance, WeLab,
a Chinese lending fintech company, has set up a joint venture with Astra Inter-
national, an Indonesian conglomerate. The JV, in which Astra International and
WeLab hold 60% and 40% of ownership respectively, started with US$21 million
capital (Berita Trans 2018). On the rationale for the joint venture partnership, a
Welab executive commented, “Astra is a very strong brand and a very strong local
partner. They have over 50 subsidiaries, 250,000 employees and millions of cus-
tomers… Welab is more of a risk and technology expert and contributes specific-
ally to these two areas, while Astra takes care of other aspects like infrastructure
services” (Interview8).
Diffused shareholder ownership often happens when a startup raises capital by issu-
ing shares to private investors, including those from overseas, and its shareholders are
diffused in their makeup. An example of foreign capital entry as a diffused shareholder
is Julo, which has received Series A funding from multiple venture capital firms. One of
their investors is Gobi Partners, an early stage venture capital firm from Shanghai,
China (Crunchbase n.d.). Some argue that this approach is more sustainable, and in-
cludes investing groups with various degrees of proactivity in organizing resources
around that investment portfolio (Interview25).
Loan products
From our data on 88 registered P2P firms, we examined the types of products offered
and found that Chinese-invested platforms possess some unique traits. The most com-
mon loan types offered by Chinese-invested firms were consumer loans, followed by
MSME and business loans (see Table 3). Interviews have shown that Chinese players
entered the market offering short-term loans (Interview1), which typically require more
advanced technology platforms and higher capital base than non-short-term loans
(Interview1). Our firm-level data confirms this view. Specifically, out of 11 firms with
solely Chinese links (18 if including firms with mixed shareholders that also included
Chinese ones), 10 provided consumer loans (14 if including the mixed cases). Compan-
ies with solely Chinese affiliations seemed to have lower performing loan rates (PLR)
but have much larger capacity for loan disbursement. Among the 29 firms offering
short-term loans, 14 had some ties with Chinese investments, five had ties to other
foreign investments, and the other 10 platforms’ investor relationship could not be
identified, proving that even among those who provide short-term loans, most came
from China.
Illegal platforms
After the implementation of POJK No. 77 - OJK’s first major P2P lending regulation in
2016, foreign investors in Indonesian P2P firms had to find an Indonesian partner.
However, some “found the registration process cumbersome and just ran the business
illegally in Indonesia” (Interview2). The former intended to create long-term businesses
in Indonesia, but the latter just “had short-term goals or merely tested the waters in
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Indonesia” (Interview2). In some cases, platforms that were initially illegal “realized that
the market is good and went through the legal registration procedure with an Indones-
ian partner” (Interview2).
Our primary interviews and secondary sources show that Chinese capital was not
only the prevalent foreign capital in legal P2P providers but also in the illegal ones
(Interview1; Interview3; Interview8; Interview13). A top executive in a private
equity firm explained, “When in 2016, the industry collapsed in China’s P2P lend-
ing, some players migrated to Indonesia. Hence, the first generation of peer-to-peer
were not the best - they were not top of the line guys. As a result, the experience
that the OJK had with “Chinese platforms” was not very good. They had to deal
with predatory lending, as what happened in China was replicated here. The indus-
try there was collapsing, and here was growing and was not regulated, and those
guys jumped here. The second wave of the Chinese investors were the more edu-
cated, understanding, and compliant of other countries’ policy. These guys are
those that want to go long-term, partner up with the right people, and do some
joint research” (Interview13).
OJK periodically blocks illegal P2P firms and investigates the origin of illegal firms by
tracing computer servers used by online operators. According to OJK’s press release,
among 227 illegal platforms blocked in July 2018, 68% came from China. From January
to February 2019, OJK blocked another 231 illegal platforms, and still, about 10% origi-
nated from China, the largest among foreign sources (Antaranews, 2019). Our inter-
views also show that it is relatively simple to publish an application on Google Play or
iOS App Store, and it is common for developers to publish multiple applications (Inter-
view8). For instance, a Chinese company called “Shoujiweidai.com” had set up six dif-
ferent illegal platforms on Google Play, including Raja Rupiah, Rumah Pinjaman,
Rupiah Bijak, Pinjaman Pintar, Danaku, Yes Rupiah (OJK 2018c). Sometimes illegal
companies may also paraphrase better platforms’ names, making it difficult even for
top players to stay afloat (Interview19).
Such illegal operations harm many parties. The daily interest rates of up to 4%
can make the sum that the users borrowed snowball by the day and eventually be-
come too hard to repay (Interview1). According to Tongam L. Tobing, the head of
OJK’s Investment Alert Task Force, the money and user data can be used for
Table 3 Characteristics of lending products on registered P2P lending platforms by firm
shareholders
Main type of loans Consumer loans MSME / Business Other
Shareholders in firm No PLR Loan disb. No PLR Loan disb. No PLR Loan disb.
Chinese as the only
foreign shareholder
10 0.84–1 3652 mil –
15.7 tril
1 1 3242 mil – – –
Mixed 5 0.72–1 0.6 tril –11 tril 2 0.99 6.4 tril – – –
Non-Chinese 6 0.97–1 6570 mil –
1.4 tril
16 0.82–1 65,080 mil –
16.6 tril
7 0.90–1 3100 mil –
224,100 mil
Information not available 12 0.93–1 7141 mil –
768,990 mil
22 0.73–1 5047 mil –
1.2 tril
7 0.99–1 6487 mil –
682,650 mil
Notes: No number of platforms, PLR performing loan rate for the last 90 days (TKB90 in Indonesian); Loan disb.: total
value of loans disbursed in IDR. Data updated as of August 2020. Mixed cases include also cases whereby Chinese
shareholders joined other local and foreign shareholders
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criminal purposes such as money laundering and terrorism financing. The govern-
ment also does not receive any tax revenue from illegal fintech companies, and the
industry as a whole also risks losing popularity due to the public distrust of such
businesses (Idnfinancial 2018).
Unethical business practices
The rapid expansion of online lending also came with rising accounts of unethical and
illegal business practices, involving particularly, but not exclusively, foreign-invested
firms. By the end of 2018, OJK had received over 2000 complaints about P2P lending
(Maulia 2018). According to the Indonesian Consumers Foundation (YLKI), a non-
profit organization whose effort is to increase consumer’s awareness of their rights and
responsibilities (YLKI n.d.), online lending has received the third highest number of
complaints out of all business sectors, despite it being relatively new. P2P firms with
the most consumer complaints addressed to YLKI are Rupiah Plus, Pinjam Kilat, Aku-
laku, Dr. Rupiah, and Uang Cepat (The Jakarta Post 2019a), two of which are known as
Chinese-invested firms. According to Pranata and Farandy (2019), 9% of all negative re-
views of P2P lending firms in Google Play from March 2016 to August 2018 related to
unethical debt collection, with Rupiah Plus, a Chinese-invested platform, topping the
number of negative reviews. Another 7% of negative Google Play reviews related to
high interest rates and charges ranging from 0.2 to 3% per day (107.4% to 4,848,172.5%
annually). While interviewees often remarked that the impact of the first wave of in-
vestments was negative and harmed the reputation of Chinese investments (Interview4;
Interview11; Interview13); the business practices were largely “not illegal” due to the
lack of regulations and laws at the time (Interview11). These practices were not exclu-
sive to Chinese platforms. However, the number of purely domestic platform was very
limited at the time, and Chinese-invested platforms quickly became the most popular
and triggered a strong market expansion. This, in turn, resulted in a spike of related
malpractices.
Lending platforms obtained the borrowers’ contacts and outsourced debt collection
to local agents who harassed the borrowers, their families, and friends with heavy-
handed measures (Iman 2018; Yuniarni 2019; Potkin et al. 2018). At times, platforms
added all the debtor’s contacts in a WhatsApp group to share his or her debts (Inter-
view19). Cintia Dewi’s case (Yuniarni 2019) reflects many who have been deceived by
unethical platforms. She had experienced harassment by debt collectors both directly
and indirectly; the debt collectors would constantly “call her and wait outside her
home, and even go as far as contacting her parents, family members, friends, and ac-
quaintances.” Defaulters often borrowed from multiple platforms and were easily
trapped in debt, as loans also carried a strikingly high-interest rate that made it difficult
to repay interests. In Cintia Dewi’s example, interest rates were 1% per day for a max-
imum period of 14 days, which largely exceeds the average of 0.05–0.08% per day by
legal platforms (Sugianto 2018). Similarly to the “naked loans” scandal in China in
2016, many complaints addressed to OJK involved lenders who threatened to post pri-
vate information such as naked pictures acquired from users’ phone galleries, or sexu-
ally harassed the borrowers online (Yuniar 2019). Often such platforms exploited the
users’ lack of digital literacy to access their smartphone data without their consent or
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buried the data access permission in terms and conditions to use the app so the users
unknowingly gave consent to sharing the data. Borrowers had difficulty contacting the
platforms that operated virtually and with an incorrect physical address to file com-
plaints (Yuniar 2019). In addition, police investigations and prosecutions of such cases
were difficult for two reasons. Firstly, most borrowers would not file official reports to
the police, for the fear that they could not repay the debt. Secondly, there were still
“non-existence of the laws” on online lending and data privacy, and no updated laws
on consumer protection upon which the police could rely on (Interview2; Interview19;
Interview23). Such unethical and illegal business practices, often employed by foreign-
invested companies, also violated Indonesian religious beliefs. Hendrikus Passagi, the
Director of OJK Fintech Regulation section stated, “Those practices go against God.
We are a religious country. In Indonesia, if I lend the money to you and you don’t pay,
I will not come to your house and humiliate you” (Potkin et al. 2018).
While most of these unethical practices are verified and documented, an interviewee
pointed out that there might also be organizations that use them to pursue political
agendas. An interviewee felt “exponents of other industries see the P2P lending indus-
try as threat, and they have motifs to erase this industry from Indonesia. [Name of
organization] collected thousands of complaints from people, but there is a political
agenda as they use these complaints to make these cases bigger and hit the OJK, rather
than to resolve them and when asked, the said organization would be reluctant to share
any evidence of the cases” (Interview7).
Policy response and institutional change
Main P2P lending policy
The POJK No. 77/POJK.01/2016 served as the first and fundamental regulation for
online P2P lending services in Indonesia. Before, the industry was essentially in a
regulatory vacuum. The regulation was “designed to protect consumers and na-
tional interests” while at the same time allow the growing of the fintech companies
to support the national economy (OJK 2017a, 2017b). It stipulates clauses concern-
ing the firm’s legal entity, permissible foreign ownership up to 85%, capital require-
ments, account requirements for borrowers and lenders, information disclosure,
and referrals towards related regulations on issues such as cybersecurity and data
privacy. More importantly, it mandates a “registration-trial operation-licensing”
path for legal P2P players: anyone wishing to operate a legal P2P lending entity in
Indonesia must first register with OJK, then undergo a one-year operating period,
and then apply to OJK for a business license (OJK 2016). By June 2020, 33 fintech
P2P lending platforms had been licensed, and 128 other platforms had been regis-
tered and not yet licensed (Eloskari 2020).
In addition, the continued rise of the online P2P lending market, and the influx of
Chinese and foreign investors in Indonesia have resulted in further regulatory and insti-
tutional responses, as shown in Fig. 3.
Regulatory sandbox
In mid-August 2018, OJK released the POJK No. 13/POJK.02/2018, establishing a regu-
latory sandbox for fintech other than P2P lending, such as credit scoring. The main
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industry advocacy group - the Indonesian Fintech Association (AFTECH) suggested
this approach. In 2016, its co-founder Sebastian Togelang remarked, “What we need is
a sandbox approach in which the regulator gives startups the freedom to be creative in
a market but in which quality and quantity can be controlled by the regulator” (Nikkei
2016).
Similar to the regulation on P2P players, firms in the fintech sandbox need to
go through three steps before applying for a business license. The first step,
which is the registration, is divided into two categories, for start-ups or non-
financial institutions and financial institutions. Financial institutions need to file
registration according to the firm’s sub-sectors (e.g., banking, the stock market,
and non-bank financial institutions). The registration with OJK includes the appli-
cation for the regulatory sandbox testing to verify whether the fintech activities
abide by current regulations. OJK mandates which fintech firms need to go
through the regulatory sandbox. Secondly, regulatory sandbox process, if neces-
sary, lasts for at most one year and can be extended to up to six months. Finally,
firms need to register for a license with OJK after obtaining positive sandbox
testing results (OJK 2018b; Putera 2019).
Professional self-regulatory institution and governance
OJK inaugurated AFPI, a self-regulating organization (SRO) to oversee the market
conduct of P2P lending firms, during the Bali Fintech Days convention on October
26, 2018 (Nabila 2018). OJK recommended AFPI’s establishment “to create institu-
tional change and development, due to the rapid expansion of the P2P lending
market” (Interview2). OJK recognized the need to protect lenders against the pos-
sible fraud and personal data misuse, and borrowers against unethical loan-
sharking activities, high-interest rates, and unreliable loan activities (Pratama 2018).
As our interviews show, several members of the industry advocacy group, the Indo-
nesian Fintech Association (AFTECH), branched out to serve in AFPI, including
Adrian Gunadi (AFPI’s Chairman) and Sunu Widyatmoko (AFPI’s Vice Chairman).
Registered P2P lending firms under OJK automatically become members of AFPI.
As of August 2019, APFI spearheaded some professional self-regulation initiatives,
such as the following:
Fig. 3 Timeline of Indonesia’s online P2P lending-related policies
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 In response to the proliferation of illegal practices in P2P lending firms in Indonesia,
AFPI set up an independent ethics committee comprised of individuals without
any ties to the industry, who investigate claims made by consumers against
registered firms, and provide recommendations. Before, OJK was responsible to
settle such complaints according to the OJK Regulation No.1/POJK.01/2013
regarding Consumer Protection in Financial Services (OJK 2015). With the new
committee, AFPI and OJK effectively established a collaboration to mediate
issues between registered Fintech platforms and their users(Sukmana 2018).
 AFPI released a code of market conduct for its members, including rules such as
limiting the type of user data that apps can access and prohibiting online and
offline harassment. In response to the complaints about high-interest rates, AFPI
has also limited the interest rate of its member platforms to 0.8% per day (34%
per annual rate), with a limit of 100% of the principal for total interest and fees
repayment. The collection period is limited to 90 days (AFPI 2019).
 An AFPI seminar on Indonesian regulations has become mandatory for platform
directors, commissioners, and shareholders (including foreign ones such as
Chinese investors) before registration with OJK (The Jakarta Post 2019b).
Interagency cooperation and collaboration with related market players
OJK has spearheaded the further effort in interagency collaboration with digital
and financial market players. Through the Task Force for Handling Alleged
Unlawful Acts in the Field of Collecting Community Funds and Investment Man-
agement, or the Investment Alert Task Force (SWI), OJK has joined with 12 other
ministries and institutions such as the Indonesian National Police and Criminal In-
vestigation Agency to crack down illegal fintech players (Interview23; West Java
Province 2019). According to the head of SWI Tongam L Tobing, SWI has han-
dled 2406 entities from 2018 to March 2020, and in 2019 SWI suspended the ac-
tivities of 1494 illegal peer-to-peer lending platforms (Antaranews 2020). Both OJK
and the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MOCIT) have
been working with Google and Apple to ban these applications on Google Play
and App Store (CNN Indonesia 2018). OJK has also regularly asked MOCIT to
block the websites of illegal platforms. The Ministry of Law and Human Rights,
and the National Consumer Protection Agency also partook in the Taskforce (The
Jakarta Post 2019b). OJK has also required Indonesian banks to block the accounts
of illegal fintech application owners and prohibit payment systems from serving il-
legal fintech apps. On the other hand, civil society seems to have limited operating
space, because of few opportunities to engage the authorities, and limited protec-
tion for their purported beneficiaries under the current laws. As one civil society
representative remarked, “It’s very difficult to talk to them (OJK)...We once sent a
letter. We’ve seen consumers coming and crying to us, but we can’t deal with
them one by one. Plus, we can’t (as we’re just facilitators). They will need to go to
BPSK (the consumer protection legal institution). And, in our consumer protection
laws, it lacks execution and implementation, and it is quite ambivalent too. If the
perpetrator has been deemed guilty, how do we ensure that they won’t do it again?
In (general) court, there is an execution command, but how about in consumer
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protection court? So to tackle the problem, we must revise the consumer protec-
tion bills” (Interview23).
International collaboration among fintech regulatory agencies and business associa-
tions is also taking shape. OJK signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) agree-
ment with the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) in October 2018 to boost
fintech innovation collaboration, knowledge exchange and regulatory environment
training for firms in each other’s market (MAS 2018). In addition to formal intergov-
ernmental cooperation, the self-regulatory industry association has conducted cross-
country knowledge exchanges with other foreign associations. For instance, AFPI has
worked with the Beijing Internet Finance Association to share knowledge about the
market and investment challenges, and has involved OJK in sharing the regulatory
practices (Interview13).
Regulatory and institutional response between Indonesia and China: a comparison
Broadly speaking, Indonesia’s regulatory and institutional responses to tame risks from
fintech expansion bear both similarities and differences with the actions undertaken by
Chinese regulators. Both governments have imposed industry-specific regulations to
regulate firm performance in a wide range of areas, although the specific regulatory re-
quirements differ. Both governments have also worked with major industry players to
launch self-regulatory associations responsible for overseeing the market conduct. Both
governments have waged campaigns against illegal fintech players through interagency
collaboration with market players. There have also been rising interests and efforts for
international coordination with other countries in regulation, though coordination be-
tween the two countries is still nascent.
Yet the two countries also show notable differences in current approaches. Indone-
sia’s regulatory sandbox for fintech other than P2P lending, which China does not have,
shows that Indonesia follows the lead of countries like UK and Australia in taking an
encouraging stance towards new business innovations, preferring to work with emer-
ging technologies and startups by keeping them under the regulators’ watch during the
testing period. Specific regulatory differences, like Indonesia’s regulation that foreign
investors can own up to 85% of the total shares of a P2P lending firm, also show that
Indonesia is still keen for the sector to expand with foreign investments, while also
hoping that domestic players will be able to benefit and learn from foreign partners or
investors. Other Indonesia-specific regulatory requirements, such as the mandate that
firms must support activities that promote financial inclusion and literacy, show that
fintech lending is still viewed as vital to boosting financial inclusion in Indonesia. While
Chinese regulators have significantly clamped down on risky P2P platforms and man-
dated the transition of existing platforms to online small lending firms, Indonesia is still
betting on P2P lending to help meet the credit demand of the underbanked.
Conclusion
Regulating emerging technologies without stifling business innovation and economic
growth can be challenging for policymakers. This paper has shown how, in the cases of
Indonesia’s online P2P lending, regulators tended towards a reactive approach, which
however established a novel system of regulations and institutional collaboration to
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tackle the adverse negative effects of these activities. In the face of foreign capital flows
powering the growth of fintech, specifically the influx of Chinese capital driven to
under-regulated growth markets by stringent regulations at home, the Indonesian state
has swiftly responded to facilitate the sector’s expansion and tame related risks. The
state has done so by not only imposing new rules and regulatory mechanisms but also
branching out to other government agencies and creating government-linked organiza-
tions to delegate the task of professional regulation and industry practices monitoring.
While the current regulatory approach in Indonesia proved timely, we recommend
several ways through which its policymakers could strengthen the governance of online
lending:
Firstly, P2P lending would benefit from the implementation of much-needed laws
and broader regulatory frameworks that address existing and emerging risks from mar-
ket expansion. For instance, with the high incidence of data privacy breaches, it is im-
perative that national governments implement a general data privacy bill, like the EU
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Current privacy and cybersecurity regula-
tions in Indonesia, as stated in Law (Undang-Undang or UU) No. 8/2011 regarding
Electronic Information and Transactions, as well as the Ministry of Communications
and Information Technology (MOCIT) Regulation No. 20/2016 on Personal Data Pro-
tection in Electronic Systems, are unsuitable for preventing large-scale breaches and do
not allow for damage recovery. The Indonesian draft law on personal data protection
was signed by President Joko Widodo and passed to the House of Representatives for
discussion in January 2020 (Carl and Wirabuana 2020).
Secondly, closer collaborations within government agencies and between the govern-
ment, civil society groups, and industry associations would be vital for the sake of inte-
grating and analyzing data from different sources and strengthening the firms’
regulatory compliance. Examples of civil society and self-regulating associations partici-
pating in the governance of emerging technologies like fintech can be found in other
countries. For instance, China’s self-regulatory industry associations have worked
closely with government regulators to strengthen the regulatory control over risks in
P2P lending, as noted earlier in this paper. To counter cyber risks such as identity theft,
citizens and community-level organizations in countries such as New Zealand,
Singapore, and Australia are encouraged to participate in cybersecurity information
sharing and have hotlines to report adverse cyber events (Thinyane and Christine
2020). Citizens and civil society organizations in Indonesia, as the paper noted earlier,
have limited channels to communicate with regulators directly, and professional self-
regulatory institutions like AFPI have served as intermediaries. More synergies between
the regulators and the civil society representing relevant interest groups such as con-
sumers, in addition to the professional self-regulatory institution like the AFPI ethics
committee, would be beneficial. Such a whole-of-society, more proactive and timely ap-
proach can help to regulate fintech risks and protect the interests of the public before
widespread adverse impacts occur.
Thirdly, policymakers and business associations could consider strengthening inter-
national cooperation in regulation and law enforcement, knowledge and technology ex-
change with the regulators, business associations, and fintech market players in main
investor countries like China and other Southeast Asian countries, and within inter-
national multilateral networks. Common international coordination arrangements
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range from bilateral agreements and initiatives (e.g., fintech MOU), to multilateral ones
coordinated by international institutions (such as FSB’s Financial Innovation Network).
Current collaboration and communication efforts involving Indonesian regulators and
associations, as noted in this paper, between OJK and MAS, and between AFPI and
Beijing Internet Finance Association, are good starting points. In addition, Indonesia
may consider joining new multilateral networks, such as the Global Financial
Innovation Network launched in 2019 to exchange learnings, develop a common sand-
box and help firms navigate between different jurisdictions as they aim for scale inter-
nationally (Taylor et al. 2020).
This study provided an initial framework for analyzing the online P2P lending market
expansion driven by foreign capital and the policy responses and institutional changes
to mitigate risks. Future empirical research should strengthen the understanding of
transboundary capital flows and analyze the business practices of foreign-invested fin-
tech firms and their impact on domestic market players. Future research should exam-
ine additional cases of regulatory and institutional responses to the expansion of online
lending markets in developing countries, to allow for cross-country comparisons and
identify innovative policy solutions. This would also help to develop stronger theoret-
ical frameworks that broadly examine the growth of emerging technology sectors in
emerging markets powered by transnational capital. It would also inform both scholars
and policymakers of the best practices in governance to balance innovation and growth
with policy intervention and risk mitigation.
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